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Abstract
Contrary to some idealized notions, Private Legal Systems 
(PLSs) are not typically locked in Darwinian competition over the 
efficiency of their norms and do not form autonomously (that is, 
without reliance on preexisting institutions) upon the identification 
of an efficient norm. The evolution of PLSs is primarily driven by the 
PLSs’ relative enforcement costs, not by the relative efficiency of the 
norm they attempt to enforce.
Because of enforcement costs, PLSs form in a path dependent 
manner, beginning by enforcing a collaborative core norm—
typically one that provides religious or social identity—then 
gradually expanding to enforce increasingly adversarial expansion 
norms. PLSs sometimes attempt to reduce path dependence by 
“inventing tradition” (creating rituals and symbols that suggest a 
shared identity)—an activity that has thus far not received much 
attention in the private ordering scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
Private legal systems (PLSs) are institutions that enforce norms 
and that are not affiliated with government, that is, with entities that 
may legitimately use violence to enforce norms. PLSs range from 
informal institutions that bear little resemblance to the public legal 
system (the law), such as norms of politeness, to ones that are very 
similar to the law, such as complex commercial arbitration among 
diamond dealers.
Scholarship on PLSs tends to focus on two questions, both 
related to the norms that PLSs enforce: what are the norms that PLSs 
enforce,1 and are these norms more or less efficient than those of the 
law.2 There is far less concern as to how PLSs develop the ability to 
enforce norms. Perhaps due to this focus on norms rather than on 
enforcement, much of the literature assumes that PLSs emerge 
autonomously in response to governance needs that are unfulfilled by 
government.
If this assumption were true, one would expect the private 
ordering landscape to be composed of a very large number of PLSs, 
each enforcing one (or a very small number) of norms. Identifying an 
unfulfilled governance need and formulating a norm to address this 
need are activities that have low barriers to entry, so a newly created 
PLS can displace an incumbent PLS in identifying the next 
opportunity to enforce a norm. Indeed, an incumbent PLS may be at 
a disadvantage, since the member3 or members that direct the PLS’s
behavior (the PLS controller) may block the enforcement of norms 
1. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
2. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724 (2001); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: 
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003).
3. I use the term “member” to refer to an individual or firm that is subject 
to the norms enforced by the PLS.
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that are efficient but that conflict with the PLS controller’s self-
interest. In contrast, a newly formed PLS can select its membership 
so as to exclude members who would object to enforcing the 
efficient norm.
Yet in reality the private ordering landscape is far less 
fragmented: a small number of PLSs (e.g., one’s peer group, 
religious community, etc.) each enforces a large number of norms. 
Though these PLSs typically enforce adversarial4 norms, they rely on 
a core collaborative norm—most commonly a norm that provides 
religious or social identity.
Consider, for example, Pax Dei (Peace of God), a movement in 
tenth and eleventh century Western Europe to protect defenseless 
peasants, among others, from feuding warlords:
The peace of God was . . . a substitute for the peace of the king. Nothing 
more. It changed nothing in the framework of peace . . . . The only 
difference was this: the place formerly occupied by the king was now 
taken by that which on earth most nearly approached the divine, the holy 
remains, piled high for the occasion in reliquaries withdrawn from every 
crypt in the province.5
The norm did not change; the enforcement mechanism did. The 
Pax Dei norm was a challenging one to enforce, since it was 
adversarial in nature—each individual warlord had much to gain by 
violating it while other warlords abided by it—and applied to a large 
number of warlords with different preferences, some who may prefer 
less violence, others who may benefit from more upheaval. When the 
public legal system—the king—proved ineffective in enforcing the 
norm, the peasants turned to private enforcement that relied on 
religion.
An examination of successful PLSs finds that they very 
frequently rely on religion, kinship, or social ties. Medieval craft 
guilds provide a second example:
Many craft gilds seem to have originated as religious fraternities whose 
members were drawn together by ties of common devotion. The starting 
point of the Mercers’ gild at York, for example, was a licence given in 
4. The degree to which a norm is adversarial is the degree to which 
members have an incentive to violate the norm; in other words, it is the relative cost 
of compelling compliance with the norm, leaving constant the environmental factors 
(e.g., the number of members, the homogeneity of their preferences, and the 
fluctuation in membership). A collaborative norm is on the far non-adversarial end 
of the spectrum (i.e., has low enforcement costs).
5. GEORGES DUBY, THE THREE ORDERS: FEUDAL SOCIETY IMAGINED 135-
36 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1980) (1978).
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1357 to merchants, mercers, drapers, hosiers and dyers to organize a 
fraternity for religious and social purposes. In most cases the fraternity,
that is, the gild in its religious and social aspects, was no doubt merged 
with the mistery, that is, the gild in its industrial aspect . . . . Bound 
together by their common calling in the pursuit of common aims, the 
mediaeval craftsmen developed an ideal of co-operation and joint effort 
which gained in intensity what it may seem to have lacked in range of 
vision.6
Other successful PLSs rely on nonreligious social identity. Robert 
Ellickson describes how ranchers in rural California are deterred by 
the threat of spreading negative gossip from allowing their cattle to 
trespass on farmers’ lands.7 Ellickson explains that gossip is an 
effective deterrent, and one preferable for the injured party to suing 
the offender, “because only the extreme deviants are immune from 
the general obsession with neighborliness.”8 Janet Landa examined 
long-distance trading of rubber in Singapore and West Malaysia in 
1969 and concluded that trading was made possible, despite 
significant information asymmetry and ineffective public
enforcement of contracts, because of trust facilitated by ethnic 
relations between the traders.9 Similarly, Avner Greif finds that long-
distance trading in the Mediterranean in medieval times was 
facilitated by ethnic and religious ties of Maghribi Jewish traders.10
This Article explains why successful PLSs rely on these core, 
cooperative norms and develops a theory on the development and 
norm selection of PLSs. In doing so, this Article heavily relies on, 
revises, and expands my earlier work.11 In a nutshell, cooperative 
norms provide PLSs with a competitive advantage, in the form of 
lower enforcement costs, over rival legal systems, and this advantage 
is difficult for rival PLSs to imitate. The enforcement costs of a new 
6. EPHRAIM LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND, VOLUME I: THE 
MIDDLE AGES 339-42 (10th ed., 1949).
7. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 57.
8. Id.
9. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman 
Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 350
(1981).
10. See generally Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic 
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
525 (1993).
11. Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179 
[hereinafter Aviram, Networks]; Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous 
Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1
(2004) [hereinafter Aviram, Paradox]; Amitai Aviram, Forces Shaping the 
Evolution of Private Legal Systems, in LAW, ECON. & EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 183
(Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011) [hereinafter Aviram, Forces].
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norm are reduced if the PLS is already enforcing some norm on the 
same members that are to be subject to the new norm, because the 
PLS can compel compliance with the new norm by denying a 
member the benefits of the already-enforced norm.
But how would a PLS enforce the preexisting norm? By 
beginning with a core norm that has very low enforcement costs, a
cooperative norm that provides religious or social identity. Once this 
core has developed, PLSs may choose expansion norms that can be 
more expensive to enforce, with each successful expansion 
increasing the value of membership and therefore reducing 
enforcement costs, allowing for enforcement of even costlier norms.
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I compares PLSs to 
other norm enforcing institutions, explains how they enforce norms, 
and explains what conditions enhance their effectiveness in 
enforcing norms. Part II considers rival theories on what drives the 
development of PLSs (autonomous formation vs. path dependent
formation) and explains why relative advantage in enforcement 
costs, rather than in norm efficiency, determines which PLS succeeds 
in enforcing norms. It then applies this insight to describe the pattern 
in which PLSs develop: first facilitating a non-adversarial core norm, 
then gradually adding layers of increasingly adversarial expansion 
norms, using the value that the core norm and successfully enforced 
expansion norms provide members to compel members’ compliance
with new expansion norms. Part III considers the role of shared 
identity in norm enforcement, highlighting a challenge to path 
dependent formation from an area that has been ignored by PLS 
scholars: the “invention of tradition” to artificially produce shared 
identity.
I. WHAT ARE PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS?
A. Taxonomy of norm enforcers based on enforcement mechanisms
This Article examines private ordering through the lens of 
enforcement mechanisms, and therefore, it distinguishes norm 
enforcers by the enforcement mechanisms they use. By 
understanding these mechanisms, we can predict which type of 
enforcer would most likely enforce a given norm.
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Norm enforcers can be distinguished into four categories based 
on their enforcement mechanisms: public enforcers, first-, second-,
and third-person enforcers.12
A public enforcer has at its disposal the most effective 
enforcement mechanism: the legitimate use of violence against a 
norm enforcer. However, the public legal system that is used by the 
public enforcer is costly and relatively inflexible in its ability to 
adjust enforcement costs (and the resulting enforcement 
effectiveness) to the benefit derived from enforcement. For example, 
it would be efficient to expend more resources to prevent certain 
norm violations (e.g., murder) than other, less harmful ones (e.g., 
possession of small amounts of illegal drugs or violation of 
immigration laws). But many of the costs of the public legal system 
are fixed, and there are operational (as well as political) constraints 
on creating a separate, scaled down system for each norm violation 
according to its social importance. As a result, with regard to less 
severe norm violations, the public legal system either over-enforces 
(spends more on enforcement than the social value from enforcing 
the particular norm) or it avoids enforcement of the norm entirely 
(such as through setting police priorities so as to ignore less harmful 
norm violations; or by leaving an undesirable activity legal and 
relying on non-public enforcers to discourage it).
First-person enforcement (self-enforcement) relies on an 
individual to adhere to a norm, even if no one else can observe or 
punish a violation. Self-enforcement relies on both self-interest 
(where complying with the norm is directly beneficial to the 
individual, as in driving on the same side of the road as other cars do 
to avoid an accident) and on an individual’s morality and sense of 
identity (e.g., an individual rejects an opportunity to have an 
extramarital affair because that conforms with the kind of person she 
is). Self-enforcement is the least expensive enforcement mechanism, 
but it is also the least flexible. One’s self-interest and morality do not 
directly track social benefits, so one may feel morally bound (or find 
it in one’s self-interest) to adhere to socially inefficient norms or feel 
no moral compulsion to adhere to a particular, socially efficient 
norm.
Second-person enforcers rely on self-enforcing exchange of 
bonds (collateral): if a party violates a norm, its counterparty can 
confiscate the collateral, and knowledge of this deters the party from 
12. This taxonomy is somewhat similar to, and inspired by, ELLICKSON,
supra note 1, at 126-27.
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violating the norm. Collateral exchange is very flexible—each 
agreement can be specifically tailored to its circumstances and 
involve as much or as little collateral (and thus as much or as little 
cost and effectiveness) as would be optimal given the importance of 
ensuring compliance in the particular transaction. However, second-
party enforcement requires negotiation between two particular 
parties, so it works very poorly when such negotiation is costly or 
impossible (e.g., in an environment in which transaction parties 
fluctuate frequently, so one frequently deals with new “strangers”).
Third-person enforcers rely on a private legal system that 
employs three enforcement mechanisms—exclusion, control, and 
switching—that rely on network effects for their effectiveness. PLSs 
are neither the most effective, nor the lowest cost, nor the most 
flexible enforcers, but they offer a good balance between these three 
traits.
Figure 1 summarizes the above taxonomy of norm enforcers.
Figure 1: Distinguishing Norm Enforcers by Their Enforcement 
Mechanism
Type Norm Enforcer Enf. Mechanism Relative 
Advantage
Public enf. (Public) legal 
system
Legitimate use of 
force
Most effective
1P 
enforcement
Self-enforcement Self-interest
Morality/identity
Lowest cost
2P 
enforcement
Bilateral 
contracting
Collateral 
exchange
Most flexible
3P 
enforcement
Private legal 
system
Exclusion
Control
Switching
Balance between 
cost, effectiveness 
& flexibility
I believe this distinction between norm enforcers based on the 
enforcement mechanism is clearer than other commonly used 
distinctions. The private ordering literature sometimes creates a 
dichotomy between public norm enforcers, who are governments, 
and private norm enforcers, who are not governments. But some 
PLSs have significant public backing and are very similar to public 
legal systems,13 whereas in other cases governments transact and 
13. For example, the King of England enacted in 1353 the “Statute of the 
Staple,” which prohibited Common Law courts “from hearing disputes arising from 
contracts made on the staple markets” (markets for important commodities, such as 
wool). Zywicki, supra note 2, at 1598. Instead, the statute created Staple Courts and 
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enforce norms without the ability to exert violence (e.g., in some 
international agreements) and must rely on collateral to secure the 
counterparty’s compliance.
Another common distinction between norm enforcers focuses 
on the degree of competition the enforcer faces in enforcing norms. 
While this distinction may be important to the content of the norm 
selected by the norm enforcer, it seems less important in determining 
the type of enforcement mechanism used and, therefore, the 
environments in which such an enforcer would thrive. Most disputes 
can be brought before multiple public legal fora, so these public legal 
systems face competition. For example, American companies can 
incorporate in any of the states, and that state’s corporate laws will 
apply to them.14 Yet the enforcement mechanisms of, say, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, bear a lot of resemblance to other, 
monopolistic public legal systems and very little resemblance to 
PLSs that also face competition. Thus, a taxonomy of norm enforcers 
that focuses solely on the degree of competition with other norm 
enforcers is unhelpful in analyzing the enforcement mechanisms of 
PLSs.
Distinguishing between norm enforcers based on their 
enforcement mechanisms enables us to identify the circumstances 
under which a particular type of enforcer should thrive and displace 
other types of enforcers. The landscape in which norm enforcers 
operate can be mapped on two axes representing sources of 
enforcement costs that are independent from the nature of the norm 
enforcer. The first axis considers the environment in which the 
enforcer operates. A harsh environment is characterized by a large 
number of members, high fluctuation in membership, and 
heterogeneous member preferences. Conversely, a benign 
environment involves a small number of members with 
homogeneous preferences and low turnover in membership.
The second axis considers the nature of the norm that is 
enforced. A more adversarial norm is one that is more costly to 
compel compliance, leaving constant the enforcement environment.15
A norm is more adversarial the greater the conflict between it and an 
instructed them to apply the (privately formed) law merchant. Id. at 1598-99. Thus, 
private law was given exclusive jurisdiction by public decree. Id.
14. Much scholarship has examined the competition between states that 
results. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
15. See supra note 4.
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individual’s self-interest, and the more the individual benefits from 
violating it when others comply. For example, if the norm is a 
prohibition on athletes to use steroids, an individual might be less 
willing to comply if she knew that all of her rivals were complying, 
since that would increase her competitive advantage from using 
steroids. As the enforcer induces more members to comply, 
resistance from other members will increase, possibly even causing 
some members who did not find it worthwhile to violate the norm 
before (e.g., were too concerned about the health effects of steroids) 
to violate it now (because they would gain a larger advantage now 
that most athletes don’t use steroids).
Mapping the enforcement landscape in this way, the relative 
advantage of each norm enforcer is shown in Figure 2.16
Figure 2: Relative Advantages of Norm Enforcers
Public enforcement, being the most effective, has a relative 
advantage when enforcement costs are so high that nothing short of 
physical coercion can induce compliance. Therefore, they have a 
relative advantage in very harsh environments and regarding very 
adversarial norms.
16. Figure 2 identifies relative advantages, which should be indicative of 
which norm enforcer would operate in which environment. However, this is not a 
perfect predictor because it assumes that enforcers are internalizing the benefit they 
confer from enforcing the norm (as well as the enforcement costs) and that enforcers 
are interested in maximizing this benefit. This is not always true. For example, the 
government may be willing to enforce a norm when a less costly enforcer is 
available because it wants to demonstrate its sovereignty or because the less costly 
enforcers would select a norm that is undesirable to the government (e.g., a cartel 
enforcing a norm to maintain prices high or a criminal organization enforcing illegal 
transactions).
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In contrast, first-person enforcement is much less effective, but 
since it is the least costly enforcer it displaces other norm enforcers 
in the area in which it is sufficiently effective—enforcing very 
collaborative norms (the environment does not affect first-person
enforcement very much, because compliance depends on self-interest 
and identity, neither of which is affected by the environment.
Second-person enforcement has a relative advantage as the 
norm is sufficiently adversarial that first-person enforcement is not 
sufficiently effective, displacing PLSs and public enforcers because 
it is more flexible (able to tailor the optimal balance of cost and 
effectiveness to each set of parties). However, as the norm becomes 
more adversarial or the environment harsher, the limited 
effectiveness of second-person enforcement makes it lose ground to 
PLSs and public enforcement. In particular, second-person 
enforcement is ineffective in harsh environments: a large number of 
members increases exponentially the number of bilateral contracts 
required to have each member have a relationship with all other 
members, and fluctuating membership requires constant negotiation 
of new contracts with new members.
Third-person enforcement—PLSs—have a relative advantage 
in the middle, where the absolute advantage that each of the other 
enforcers has (in effectiveness, cost or flexibility) does not give it a 
relative advantage. For example, a highly adversarial norm in a very 
harsh environment requires the public enforcer’s absolute advantage 
in effectiveness—no other enforcer could induce compliance. But a 
moderately adversarial norm in a somewhat harsh environment could 
also be enforced by less effective norm enforcers, so a PLSs lower 
costs and greater flexibility make it more attractive. Likewise, the 
absolute cost advantage of first-person enforcement ceases to give it 
a relative advantage in enforcement when the norm is sufficiently
adversarial that self-enforcement is not sufficiently effective to 
induce compliance.
B. Second-Person Enforcement
It is usually not difficult to distinguish third-person
enforcement (by PLSs) from public enforcement (which can 
legitimately use violence to enforce norms) and from first-person
enforcement (which relies on individuals’ self-interest and sense of 
morality). The difference between third-person enforcement and 
second-person enforcement merits additional discussion because in 
both cases norms are enforced on an individual through the response 
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of another party that has no right compel compliance through 
violence. The key difference between second- and third-person
enforcement is that the former relies on an exchange of bonds, while 
the latter relies on network effects. In this Subsection I will discuss 
the second-person enforcement mechanism of collateral exchange.
Then, in the Subsection that follows, I will discuss third-person 
enforcement mechanisms.
Second-person enforcement relies on the exchange of bonds. 
Bonds are interests of an assuring party that are placed at the mercy 
of an assured party, such as collateral. The assured party can 
confiscate or destroy a bond at will, causing harm to the assuring 
party. The bond should deter the assuring party from defaulting on 
an obligation, since a default could cause the assured party to 
confiscate the bond.17 To mitigate the risk that the assured party 
would opportunistically confiscate the bond without justification, 
and to guarantee reciprocal obligations when a transaction involves 
obligations from both parties, bonds can be exchanged.18
Bilateral bonding is an expensive enforcement system, and 
often a crude one. Nonreciprocal bonding (i.e., providing a bond 
17. The public legal system typically creates such bonds by default through 
contract law. Each party to an enforceable agreement can petition to use the state’s
enforcement machinery to enforce the other party’s obligations. In some cases, 
criminal law may also intervene. When bilateral contracts are enforced by courts, 
they share the traits of public enforcement. For example, they can benefit from 
government’s monopoly on legitimate violence in enforcing a judgment. But they 
are also limited by government’s norm selection and enforcement priorities. For 
example, a contract may be deemed unenforceable as against public policy, or it 
may be enforceable in theory but not in practice because the judicial process is slow 
and expensive. Thus, to the extent that bilateral contracting relies on public
enforcement, it is not an alternative to public, but a form of it.
18. Oliver Williamson calls this practice an “exchange of hostages.” Oliver
E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (citing Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining,
46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 300 n.17 (1956)).
In fact, a literal exchange of hostages was among the early forms in which 
this mechanism was used to assure commitment to peace treaties. Gregory 
of Tours describes the use of this mechanism in the year 511: “But 
Theoderic and Childebert entered into a treaty and each took an oath that 
neither would wage war upon the other. They took hostages so that they 
might the more firmly adhere to what they had promised. Many sons of 
senatorial families were thus given.”
Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 188 n.13 (quoting Gregory of Tours, Enslaving 
Noble Families, in 71 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS 255 (J.P. Migne ed., 1849), 
reprinted in A SOURCE BOOK FOR MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 288-89 (Roy C. 
Cave & Herbert H. Coulson eds., 1965)).
40 Michigan State Law Review 2014:29
without receiving one) leaves the party offering the bond vulnerable 
to the other party’s ability to confiscate the bond without cause. 
Reciprocal bonding is subject to reciprocal confiscation, which may 
leave both parties worse off, but not by enough to deter an 
opportunist. For example, suppose that Jack agrees to sell to Jill his 
share of Acme stock for $10. In order to bond each other into 
performing their contract, each gives the other $100 in cash as 
collateral. When Acme’s share price drops to $5, Jill reneges on the 
agreement. When Jack retaliates by confiscating Jill’s collateral, Jill 
can confiscate Jack’s collateral so that the bonds will offset each 
other without deterring Jill.
Given this weakness, instead of reciprocal bonding a party can 
provide asymmetrical collateral: a bond that harms one party without 
providing the other party with any utility. A hostage exchange is one 
such example: killing a hostage harms the hostage’s kin but does not 
directly benefit the murderer. Likewise, if person A sullies B’s
reputation, then B is harmed while A does not receive any benefit. If 
A were seen to benefit from the harm to B’s reputation, the 
credibility of A’s negative information about B would be 
undermined.
But even with asymmetrical collateral, there is a risk of 
insufficient deterrence. First, destroying collateral upon suffering a 
perceived offense may be rational, even when the destruction of the 
collateral is not profitable, because such destruction enhances
deterrence: it indicates that the same action may be taken again in the 
future if another offense is perceived.19 But while excessive 
sensitivity may provide increased deterrence, it also risks undoing a 
bond. Each party has an incentive to react to minor slights in order to 
deter the other party from attempting even minor opportunistic 
behavior at his expense. Therefore, parties may overreact, 
confiscating the bond at the first perception of an offense in the hope 
of greater deterrence of the other party in future transactions. But 
once a bond is confiscated, that other party is likely to retaliate by 
confiscating the bond it holds, eliminating the assurance mechanism
and increasing the likelihood of a cycle of opportunistic—or outright 
malicious—behavior.
Second, collateral designed to be costly to one party but useless 
to the other party may be handled in ways that create utility to the 
latter party. For example, rather than killing a hostage, the hostage 
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 49-60 (rev. ed. 1998).
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may be enslaved, providing the enslaving party with utility.20
Likewise, collateral useless to the possessing party but useful to a 
third party may be traded to the third party.
Third, the value of the collateral is often hard to determine. 
Collateral deters only opportunistic action that is no more profitable 
than the collateral’s value; otherwise, its owner would find it 
profitable to commit the opportunistic act, pocket the gain, and 
accept the loss of the collateral. Since gains from opportunistic 
behavior vary widely, it is hard to anticipate the optimal value of the 
collateral, and almost any value of collateral would fail to deter some 
extremely profitable opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, since 
parties exchanging bonds differ in the degree to which each is 
vulnerable to the other party’s opportunism and in the loss of utility 
they suffer in providing the bond, parties might disagree on the 
optimal value of the bond.
Fourth, providing collateral is costly even when it is not 
confiscated because of its opportunity cost: a work of art given as 
collateral does not bring joy to its owner while it is held by others; an 
asset used as collateral for a transaction with one party is unavailable 
or less valuable to secure obligations with other parties.21 These costs 
create an incentive to reduce the size of the collateral as much as 
possible.
To summarize, bilateral contracting that relies on public 
enforcement is not second-person enforcement but a form of public 
enforcement, sharing its advantages and disadvantages. Bilateral 
contracting that does not rely on public enforcement is costly and 
therefore, in many environments, is displaced by less costly PLS 
enforcement.
20. This is precisely what happened in the hostage exchange between 
Theoderic and Childebert. See Gregory of Tours, supra note 18, at 289. Gregory of 
Tours describes, “[B]ut when a new quarrel broke out between the kings [the 
hostages] were reduced to servitude . . . . And those who had taken care of them now 
made slaves of them.” Besides deriving utility from the hostages, enslaving them 
(rather than killing them) may be intended to inflict some harm on the hostage’s kin,
“while maintaining future deterrence through the ability to inflict additional harm 
(by killing the hostages).” Aviram, Paradox, supra note 11, at 18 n.51.
21. Even intangible collateral such as reputation loses its value to one 
counterparty if another counterparty “confiscates” it. For example, if A’s reputation 
serves as collateral for both A’s obligations to B and to C, then C’s value from the 
collateral will diminish if B sullies A’s reputation. Therefore, reputation loses value 
as collateral the more counterparties are able to “confiscate” it.
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C. Third-Person Enforcement: Private Legal Systems
Viewed through the lens of enforcement capabilities, a PLS is a 
multi-party institution that enforces norms on its members through 
the use of network effects.22 Network effects provide three
mechanisms to enforce norms on members.23 The “exclusion 
mechanism” is the ability to deter norm violations and prevent future 
violations by expelling a member and prohibiting other members 
from transacting with the offending former member. Network effects 
galvanize this mechanism because the larger the number of members 
and the greater the amount of interaction among members, the 
greater the value of membership, which is lost upon expulsion.
The “control mechanism” directs transactions through PLS-
controlled facilities to force certain desirable behavior, prevent 
undesirable behavior, or collect information that enables detection of 
undesirable behavior.24 For example, a PLS can use its possession 
and ownership of a shared facility, such as a guildhall or an online 
social network’s servers, to force members to act in desirable ways
or to detect member behavior that violates the PLS’s norms. It may 
structure a shared physical space or the software used by members to 
interact so that it forces parties to interact in a way compliant with 
the PLS norms. Network effects galvanize this mechanism because 
the greater the amount of business transacted through PLS facilities, 
the more indispensable those facilities are to members, and therefore 
the more the members need to transact through these facilities, under 
the PLS’s watchful eye and subject to facility designs that encourage 
norm compliant behavior.
Finally, the “switching mechanism” reduces opportunistic 
behavior by providing access to alternative counterparties. In other 
words, the switching mechanism shifts relationship-specific 
investments from the relationship with a particular party to the 
relationship with the PLS. For example, suppose that Ann agrees to 
buy from Bob, for $100, tickets to a Wimbledon tennis match. 
Relying on the agreement, she purchases plane tickets to London. 
22. Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 183 n.1.
23. Aviram, Networks, supra note 11, at 1204-11.
24. I distinguished between the control mechanism, which used PLS 
facilities to encourage or discourage certain behaviors, and the information 
mechanism, which used PLS facilities to detect norm violations. Id. I now believe 
there is no justification to distinguish these two functions of employing network 
facilities to enforce norms and therefore consider what I used to call the information 
mechanism as a subset of the control mechanism.
Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering 43
Bob then demands $200 for the match tickets, or he will renege on 
the deal. Ann may well agree, in order to salvage the value of her 
plane tickets. But if the purchase takes place on an online 
marketplace, there are likely numerous other match ticket sellers; 
even if Bob was the cheapest, Ann could probably get a ticket for
under $200. Knowing this, Bob would likely not act 
opportunistically in the first place.
Most PLSs employ a centralized bonding mechanism that uses 
as collateral certain intangible assets, such as the right of 
membership in the PLS, members’ reputation, or access to a 
personally or economically significant location (a holy shrine, the 
floor of an exchange, etc.). “Confiscating” this collateral means 
expulsion from the PLS, tarnishing a member’s reputation or 
denying access to locations significant to the member.
To overcome the problems of bilateral bonding, a PLS ideally 
forms “a centralized bonding mechanism [with the following 
features]: (1) an independent party (the PLS) holds the collateral of 
all members and has control over its confiscation; (2) the collateral . . 
. does not lose utility by being controlled by the independent party; 
(3) the independent party does not profit from [opportunistically] 
confiscating the collateral;”25 and (4) the expected cost to a member 
from the confiscation of the collateral is greater than the expected 
profits from defaulting on the norm.
Element (1) eliminates the risk of retaliation confiscations,
such as between Jack and Jill in the above example, and also places 
the confiscation decision at the hands of a repeat player—the PLS—
who may suffer if its decisions are arbitrary. “Some PLSs (e.g., 
common social courtesy) are decentralized, lacking a [controller 
who] decides whether to confiscate the collateral.”26 When PLSs
expand to enforce more adversarial norms, they are likely to develop 
a centralized body of officials who investigate suspected norm 
violations and are authorized to exclude offending members, with 
their decision binding on all members. Another structural 
development is a secondary boycott norm that excludes members 
who continue to interact with the excluded member. Finally, the 
greatest control over confiscating the collateral is obtained if the PLS 
can direct all PLS transactions through a common essential facility 
that is managed by the PLS, such as a common room, trading floor or 
25. This feature requires that “remaining members do not profit from 
excluding the expelled member.” Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 190.
26. Id.
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computer system used by the members to transact their common 
business. This allows the PLS to affect an expulsion by denying a 
member access to the facility, without having to rely on members’
adherence to its decision.
Element (2) reduces the costs of providing the collateral. 
Unlike many physical assets, the common collateral used in PLSs—a
right of membership in a PLS, one’s reputation among members, 
access to a personally or economically significant location—does not 
lose value from being controlled by the PLS.
Element (3) addresses the risk of opportunistic confiscation of 
the collateral. The collateral in a PLS is usually asymmetrical (a 
member gains from having it, the PLS does not gain from taking it) 
because a PLS would lose some network effects by excluding a 
member. However, because members often compete in certain 
spheres, occasionally some members would gain more from 
eliminating another member than they would suffer from the 
reduction in PLS network effects if that member were eliminated—a
strategy called “degradation.”27 This would typically occur when 
there are few members, and thus the weakening or elimination of one 
gives others a significant advantage, and when the PLS provides 
sufficiently significant benefits, so that the expelling a member 
would significantly weaken it. When members benefit from an 
opportunistic expulsion of another member, the PLS is less effective 
in enforcing norms.
Element (4)—that a member’s loss from expulsion is greater 
than the benefit from violating the norm—is required for the threat of 
confiscation to deter a potential norm violator. This depends on the 
benefit from violating the norm (i.e., how adversarial the norm is) 
and on the benefit a member derives from association with the PLS. 
Newly formed PLSs have yet to provide utility, and therefore 
expulsion from the newly formed PLS is not costly. Some incumbent 
PLSs also provide low utility to members, either because the benefits 
they already provide are not sufficiently great to surpass the benefits 
of violating an adversarial norm or because they cannot effectively 
exclude a member.28
27. Aviram, Networks, supra note 11, at 1212-17.
28. The inability to exclude a member may either be due to the PLS 
needing the member more than the member needs the PLS, or due to structural 
limitations of the PLS in ensuring all members complied with the decision to 
exclude a particular member. A social group, for example, may rely on negative 
gossip to ostracize a member. However, the PLS can only disseminate the negative 
gossip; the decision to ostracize is taken by each member individually.
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The first three elements are a matter of PLS design. A PLS 
could fulfill them from the moment it was created. The fourth 
element, however, distinguishes incumbent PLSs from new ones: the 
expected cost to a member from being punished by the PLS depends 
on the effectiveness of the three enforcement mechanisms that were 
described in Part I.A. The effectiveness of these mechanisms 
depends, in turn, on the network effects produced by interactions 
within the PLS. Thus, incumbent PLSs can be expected to have 
lower norm enforcement costs than newly formed ones. Part II 
explains how this characteristic leads to a particular pattern of PLS 
development: path dependent formation.
II. PATH DEPENDENT FORMATION OF PLSS
A. Two Theories on the Evolution of PLSs
At a high level of abstraction, there are two alternative theories 
for the evolution of PLSs that differ over the main factor over which 
potential PLSs compete, success in which allows the PLS to survive. 
One might view them as a demand-side theory, which focuses on the 
norm’s efficiency (i.e., the benefit to members from the enforced 
norm that indicates members’ demand for enforcing the norm), and a 
supply-side theory, which focuses on the PLS’s efficiency in 
enforcing (supplying) the norm.
The first theory, which I call autonomous formation,29 views 
PLS evolution as competition between potential PLSs over the
efficiency of the norm they enforce. Potential PLSs experiment with 
various norms, and the surviving PLSs are the ones that successfully 
identify “efficient” norms—in the sense of maximizing the welfare 
of the PLS’s members—and demonstrate this efficiency to the 
members. In this world, incumbent PLSs do not have a significant 
advantage over newly formed PLSs because incumbency does not 
29. By “autonomous formation,” I mean the creation of a PLS without 
reliance on a preexisting norm enforcing institution. I claim that a PLS rarely forms 
without reliance on a preexisting foundation and that this preexisting foundation is 
almost ubiquitously a collaborative norm—typically one that provides religious or 
social identity. Because much of the private ordering literature focuses on the lack of 
reliance on government, one may mistakenly interpret autonomous as “independent 
from government,” but this is not the meaning I intend. In challenging the notion of 
autonomous formation, I do not dispute that PLSs can, and frequently do, form and 
evolve without relying on government actions, but they very rarely form and evolve 
without relying on some preexisting norm enforcing institution, be it government or 
a preexisting PLS.
46 Michigan State Law Review 2014:29
typically increase the ability to devise more efficient norms. Indeed, 
incumbent PLSs are likely disadvantaged relative to newcomers if 
either: (1) norms they already enforce are at odds with a newly 
devised efficient norm, and thus the incumbent would not want to 
enforce the new norm; or (2) the efficient scope of the new norm 
does not overlap with an incumbent PLS’s membership.30 Thus, if 
PLSs live and die by the efficiency of the norms they devise, then we 
should expect an almost random pattern of PLS development, in 
which new PLSs autonomously form as they identify an efficient 
norm. In this world, a new norm is likely to be enforced by a new 
PLS.
The second theory, which I call the path dependent formation, 
views PLS evolution as competition between potential PLSs over the 
cost of enforcing the norm. Under this theory, PLSs with high 
enforcement costs cannot credibly assure potential members that 
they will be able to enforce the norms they espouse, but PLSs with 
lower enforcement costs can. Faced with a choice between a low 
probability of enforcing the most desirable norm and a high 
probability of enforcing a less desirable, but still somewhat 
beneficial, norm, potential members are likely to grudgingly throw 
their lots with the latter PLS.
As explained below, a PLS’s incumbency significantly reduces 
its enforcement costs. As a result, and contrary to the autonomous 
formation theory, a new norm is likely to be enforced by an 
incumbent PLS, and a small number of PLSs expand and control 
most private norm enforcement over a given group of members. The 
main check on the growth of PLSs, which prevents a single PLS 
from enforcing all norms, is that a PLS’s enforcement mechanisms 
are effective against only its members. To enforce norms that require 
the cooperation of a different set of actors, the PLS must expand its 
membership. This expansion in turn increases the heterogeneity of 
member preferences, which increases the costs of enforcing all PLS 
norms, including ones already enforced. To avoid diminishing the 
effectiveness of its norm enforcement, which might open the door for 
a competing PLS to step in, an incumbent PLS will likely forego 
enforcing norms that require significant membership expansion.
Since the enforcement of a new norm is likely to be in the 
hands of an incumbent PLS, and since the PLS has some discretion 
30. A new PLS could select its members so as to fit the efficient scope of 
the new norm, while an incumbent PLS would be forced to modify its membership 
if it wishes to also enforce the new norm.
Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering 47
over the content of the norm it enforces, the norms enforced today 
depend on the PLSs that existed yesterday—hence a path dependent 
formation.31
B. Assessing PLS Enforcement Costs
While the literature on PLSs has not developed a framework 
for assessing norm enforcement costs, another body of legal and 
economic scholarship has addressed this issue in great depth: the 
antitrust literature addressing cartel sustainability.32 Cartels are norm 
enforcers that enforce a particular, highly adversarial norm: the 
maintenance of above-market prices or the delineation of markets 
between cartel members. Since George Stigler’s seminal article,33 the 
literature on cartel sustainability has focused on the cartel’s
enforcement costs. Sustainable cartels have lower enforcement costs 
due in large part to homogenous preferences of members (which 
results from homogeneous products and stable market demand), a 
small number of members with a high aggregate market share, and a 
stable membership (facilitated by high barriers to entry and little or
no competition with rival cartels over the members). These factors 
affect enforcement costs of other PLSs.
However, the utility to PLS scholars from the literature on 
cartels is limited because the cartel norm is so adversarial. The 
benefit from defecting from a cartel is so great that, in most 
circumstances, cartels can be enforced only in extremely benign 
environments, involving a small number of members with 
homogenous preferences and stable membership. When this benign 
environment deteriorates, cartels tend to collapse.
In contrast, the PLSs that most resemble the public legal
system have a large number of members with heterogeneous 
preferences, and barriers to entry are low (in the sense that many 
individuals may migrate into the geographical or social sphere in 
which the PLS operates). PLSs are able to enforce norms in such 
harsh environments because of their ability to rely on government 
31. On the definition and nature of path dependence, see Paul A. David, 
Path Dependence: A Foundational Concept for Historical Social Science, in LAW,
ECON. & EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, supra note 11, at 88.
32. See generally Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 
J.L. & ECON. 241 (1996); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON.
44 (1964).
33. Stigler, supra note 32.
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institutions and particularly on government’s monopoly on legitimate 
force.
The cartel literature would predict that in this harsh 
environment private enforcement is unsustainable, yet this prediction 
conflicts with the existence of PLSs such as the medieval craft guild 
(which enforced, among other things, a cartel norm) or Pax Dei
(which enforced limits on warfare—an even more adversarial norm 
than a cartel). PLSs are able to enforce such adversarial norms in 
harsh environments because they begin by enforcing less adversarial 
norms and only later expand into more adversarial norms. As a 
result, many PLSs become more sustainable over time as they 
expand to enforce more norms, in contrast to narrow cartels, which 
tend to become less sustainable over time.34
To the main factors mentioned in the antitrust literature as 
determining enforcement costs—homogeneity of member 
preferences, number and aggregate power of members relative to 
potential members (market share, in the antitrust context), and degree 
of fluctuation in membership—we should add an additional factor: 
how adversarial the norm is. The degree to which a norm is 
adversarial is not a factor explored in cartel literature because that 
literature focuses on just two adversarial norms: price fixing and 
market allocation.35 The broader world of PLSs ranges from 
nonadversarial norms to highly adversarial ones. The enforcement of 
less adversarial norms can succeed in harsh environments in which 
autonomous enforcement of cartels would be impossible.
C. Incumbency and the Paradox of Autonomous Formation
As the literature on cartels predicts, the fact that a highly 
adversarial norm is efficient for its members is not sufficient to 
sustainably enforce the norm in harsh environments characterized by 
a large number of members, high fluctuation in membership, and 
heterogeneous member preferences. This is due to a “chicken and 
egg” paradox, which I call the autonomous formation paradox: “to 
enforce a norm efficiently, a PLS must ensure the cooperation of its 
members. But the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to secure 
34. Dick, supra note 32, at 268-69.
35. Dick does find that cartels that are created to share costs are more 
sustainable than those created to fix prices, a finding that suggests that the price 
fixing norm is more adversarial than the cost-sharing norm. Id. at 275. For the most 
part, however, cartel scholarship analyzes adversarial price fixing and market 
allocating arrangements, rather than other, less adversarial ones.
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this cooperation depends on a PLS’s ability to confer benefits to its 
members—primarily the ability, not yet existing in a newly formed 
PLS, to efficiently enforce norms.”36
Consider an alternative history replacing Pax Dei: the peasants 
in a region could have convened and agreed to pool their resources,
without relying on religion, to intimidate the warlords into 
undertaking peace oaths. If all peasants followed through with their 
promise, this norm would benefit them. However, enforcing this 
norm—like other norms providing public goods—requires 
addressing a collective action problem: the peasant coalition would 
deter warlords even if an individual peasant defected, and the 
resulting peace would benefit all, including those who defected. 
Furthermore, if a single peasant supported the movement while 
others defected, the movement would fail, and the individual peasant 
would be punished for his participation. A peasant’s incentives, 
structured here as a prisoner’s dilemma, clearly favored defection.
The PLS literature suggests that reputation facilitates 
cooperation. But reputation in itself cannot enforce norms. 
Reputation facilitates norm enforcement only by affecting 
interactions in a vibrant network that provides important benefits to 
the party carrying the reputation. When a PLS is in its infancy and 
does not yet confer significant benefits to its members, one’s
reputation among the PLS’s members does not have a significant 
effect. Stated differently: bad reputation is shorthand for the threat to 
deploy the three enforcement mechanisms that PLSs use (Section
I.A). These mechanisms are only as effective as the network effects 
from members’ interactions within the PLS. A newly formed PLS 
has no network effects and therefore very weak enforcement 
mechanisms, so having a bad reputation within the PLS is not much 
of a threat.
The paradox of autonomous formation is a problem of 
assurance: if all members of a newly formed PLS could be assured 
that all other members would comply with a norm, the newly formed 
PLS would be as effective as a similarly sized incumbent. However, 
bilateral bonding is very expensive (Section I.B) and multi-lateral, 
centralized bonding (Section I.C) relies on network effects that are
not yet realized in the newly formed PLS. If no other PLS or 
government enforcer can step in to enforce the norm, and if the norm 
is sufficiently beneficial to justify the large expense, then perhaps the
newly formed PLS would use costly bilateral bonding to bootstrap 
36. Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 187.
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the PLS until it developed the network effects that would facilitate 
effective centralized bonding.37 But in most cases, an incumbent PLS 
would expand to enforce the new norm, displacing the newly formed 
PLS that suffers from higher enforcement costs.
This occurred in the case of Pax Dei. Rather than a new PLS 
relying on exchanges of collateral between peasants, the peace 
movement relied on the Christian social network that provided its 
members with significant spiritual benefits, including a sense of 
belonging to a community and a sense of security derived from belief 
in divine oversight. Reneging on what was perceived to be a 
covenant with God would result in excommunication and the loss of 
benefits religion provided. While religious faith could aid the success 
of Pax Dei, it was not necessary for the peace movement’s success,
as even those members who believed that breaking the peace oaths 
would not invite divine wrath feared the effects of exclusion from the 
Christian community.
D. Path Dependent Formation: Core Norms
To avoid the paradox of autonomous formation, PLSs that 
(ultimately) successfully enforce highly adversarial norms begin by 
enforcing core norms: non-adversarial norms that members are 
inclined to comply with even when it is not certain that all members 
will comply. The most common core norms affect members’ shared 
identity, and are social, religious, or both. Such norms provide 
members with a sense of community, social interaction, and spiritual 
guidance. These norms are not very adversarial; people are more 
37. The existence of cartels provides examples of adversarial norms that are 
enforced without reliance on preexisting nonadversarial core norms. Cartels’
fragility and their near absence in all but the most accommodating environments 
demonstrates, however, that this is a suboptimal enforcement method that survives,
with moderate effectiveness, only because no superior enforcer displaced it. Another 
example of private norm enforcement that does not rely on nonadversarial core 
norms is provided by Karen Clay, who describes trade in Mexican California in the 
1830s. Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican 
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202, 202 (1997). Unlike the traders described by 
Landa, supra note 9, at 361, and Greif, supra note 10, those described by Clay did 
not share a common ethnicity or religion. Some collaboration between merchants 
developed, though it was very limited in comparison to that among the Maghribi 
traders described by Greif, supra note 10. While the traders in Mexican California 
exchanged information on dishonest colleagues, they rarely succeeded in imposing 
collective punishment. In contrast, the Maghribi traders frequently imposed 
collective punishment—a more adversarial and more effective norm than 
information sharing.
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willing to interact socially with a group of strangers than to make 
binding promises to the same strangers, especially when they are not 
sure how many of these people would reciprocate.
Norms that shape a shared identity, such as religious, 
nationalist, tribal, and other norms, tend not to be adversarial because 
they create a desire in members to enforce the norms and punish 
violators, as a vindication of the identity. Allowing someone to 
violate ideological norms and go unpunished questions the validity 
of the ideology, or at least the importance of the ideology to the 
identity of members who acquiesce to the violation. In contrast, by 
punishing the violator, a member reaffirms the centrality of the 
ideology to her identity. Potential norm violators are less likely to 
violate norms when the violation questions their identity. No less 
important, members who do not share the identity, such as a 
nonbeliever who is a member of a religious community, would still 
be hesitant to violate an identity-based norm if they expect that most 
other members do share the identity and would therefore receive 
psychic benefit from seeing the norm offender punished.
Another enforcement advantage of core norms that shape a 
shared identity is that they reduce competition between PLSs by 
increasing the cost of switching to another PLS. Learning the 
nuances of a shared identity is time consuming, and the lack of 
familiarity in them is easy to detect. Thus, they present a 
relationship-specific investment in a PLS that shares the identity. A 
member contemplating violating norms enforced by the PLS will 
lose the investment he made in learning the network’s culture and 
will have to make a new investment in learning the identity of the 
new PLS he joins. In the meantime, he will be identified by the new 
network as an outsider, possibly for quite a while.38 Some identities, 
such as ethnicity and religions that do not allow members to convert 
to another religion, make switching PLSs nearly impossible.
The ability of PLSs based on religious identity to regulate 
believers is enhanced by two additional benefits.39 First, a religious 
belief in an afterlife or reincarnation facilitates rewards and 
punishments that come after death.40 Such incentives are powerful in 
38. As Ellickson reports, people who resided in Shasta County for a decade 
were still viewed by most locals as newcomers and outsiders. ELLICKSON, supra
note 1, at 38 n.14.
39. Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 192.
40. Id.; Gary Richardson & Michael McBride, Religion, Longevity, and 
Cooperation: The Case of the Craft Guild, 71 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 172, 172-73
(2009).
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environments of high mortality,41 or when being taken advantage of 
may lead to death.42 Second, a religious belief in an omniscient and 
omnipotent god assures believers that all violations would be 
detected and punished.43
E. Path Dependent Formation: Expansion Norms
Once a PLS is successfully enforcing a core norm, it can 
choose to enforce expansion norms that are more adversarial, using 
the threat of denying violators access to the benefits of the core norm 
(e.g., with a religious norm, the threat of excommunication). 
Expansion norms need to satisfy the following conditions:
(1) PLS has an incentive to enforce: The PLS controller must 
find it attractive to enforce the norm.
(2) PLS is able to secure member compliance: Member 
benefits, prior to expansion, from PLS membership must exceed the 
expected benefit to a member from violating the norm.44 Otherwise, 
expulsion from the PLS would not deter potential norm violators. 
Early in the life of a PLS, while it enforces relatively few or less 
beneficial norms, it can expand only to slightly more adversarial 
41. Aviram, Forces, supra note 11, at 192. Consider the Pax Dei
prohibition on warfare during holy days: 
If person A abides by the norm, [say by refraining from attacking on a 
holy day,] while person B violates the norm and surprises A, then A may 
die. If punishment and rewards are limited to one’s lifetime, then the risk 
of being taken advantage of may make this norm unenforceable, since A 
cannot be rewarded posthumously for complying with the norm. However, 
a reward in one’s afterlife may be sufficient incentive for a believer to 
abide by the norm.
Id. at 193.
42. Id. at 192.
[C]onsider a norm of honoring one’s promises, enforced at a time of very 
high mortality[, such as] during a plague. If A is to honor her promise, she 
foregoes the option of opportunistically reneging on a now unprofitable 
promise. In return, she may expect others to honor their promises in the 
future. But if A believes she may die soon, before others honor their 
promises to her, she may renege now. [Yet] if A believes that she would 
be rewarded in her afterlife (or be reincarnated in a manner that rewards 
her for her good deeds in her current life), then her death does not 
constrain the ability to incentivize her.
Id. at 193.
43. Id. at 192.
44. The expected benefit to a member from violating a norm is a significant 
factor affecting how adversary the norm is (together with the degree to which a 
member is vulnerable if she complies with the norm while others violate it).
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norms. However, the benefit from membership increases with each 
successful enforcement of an expansion norm that is advantageous to 
the members, allowing the PLS to then select expansion norms that 
were too adversarial to enforce earlier.
(3) Member compliance is sufficient: Securing the compliance 
of the PLS’s current (pre-expansion) members must be sufficient for 
the expansion norm to yield a net benefit to the members without 
requiring compliance of other parties. A PLS’s enforcement 
mechanisms are effective against only its members. If a potential 
expansion norm requires the cooperation of a different set of actors, 
then the PLS would not have a particular advantage in enforcing that 
norm.
The PLS literature on the enforcement of adversarial expansion 
norms is much richer than on core norms.45 Adversarial expansion 
norms attract the attention of legal scholars and economists because 
they are more similar to the norms enforced by the public legal 
system—they look more like “law.” The literature’s focus on the 
content and efficiency of the norm rather than on a norm’s
enforcement costs places the spotlight on the more complex—and 
adversarial—expansion norms. While these expansion norms attract 
much attention, the core norms that support them are often ignored 
or treated as curious details rather than essential elements.
Notable exceptions are Landa, who highlighted the role of 
ethnic ties in facilitating long-distance trading of rubber in Singapore 
and West Malaysia,46 and Greif, who highlighted the role of ethnic 
and religious ties in long-distance trading in the Mediterranean 
during medieval times.47 Both articles emphasize the importance of 
the ethnic/religious core norm in supporting an adversarial expansion 
norm (in these cases, honoring one’s contracts). Lisa Bernstein48 and 
Barak Richman49 likewise highlight the role of religion in enforcing 
informal contracts among diamond dealers.50
45. For an analysis of case studies from the PLS literature reinterpreted 
through the lens of core norms supporting expansion norms, see Aviram, Paradox,
supra note 11, at 46-58.
46. Landa, supra note 9, at 350.
47. Greif, supra note 10, at 525-27.
48. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140-41 (1992).
49. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: 
Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2351-52
(2004).
50. Ellickson also connected a core norm to an expansion norm by 
highlighting the importance of social identity (neighborliness) in the PLS that 
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These articles, however, confine themselves to a particular 
adversarial norm: the enforcement of informal contracts. They also 
focus almost exclusively on the particular core norm that appears in 
the case study each article considers—an ethnic norm in the case of 
Landa51 and an overlapping ethnic and religious norm in the cases of 
Greif, Bernstein, and Richman.52 This Article presents a broader 
theory that attempts to unify common traits of these seemingly 
disparate norms, distinguishing norms by the degree they are 
adversarial and demonstrating how that difference determines which 
norm gets enforced first and by whom.
Furthermore, most PLS scholarship treats PLSs as static, 
endeavoring to explain why an existing PLS is effective but not how 
it came to be effective. In contrast, this Article considers the dynamic 
process of PLS development and suggests how it is that a PLS comes 
to bundle the enforcement of particular norms, and in what order.
III. ON IDENTITY AND NORM ENFORCEMENT
This Article argues that the development of PLSs is path 
dependent because in most environments highly adversarial norms 
will be enforced by incumbent PLSs that began by enforcing non-
adversarial core norms—mainly norms that create a shared identity 
among members. Since the content of a norm depends on the 
preferences of the enforcing PLS, the content of new, highly 
adversarial norms will depend on which PLSs already exist and 
enforce less adversarial norms on the same group of members whose 
behavior needs to be regulated to ensure the success of the new 
norm.
The economics of identity have received increased attention 
from scholars in recent years. In the context of the group norms, 
some scholars called to replace traditional, incentive-based models 
(in which an actor follows norms because of fear of punishment for 
others if she deviates) with identity-based models (in which an actor 
addresses cattle trespassing on farmland. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 56-58. 
Ellickson’s focus, however, was on the content of the expansion norm—how were 
trespasses addressed and how does it compare to the legal rule—rather than on the 
PLS’s enforcement costs. Id.
51. See generally Landa, supra note 9 (examining ethnic Chinese traders in 
Malaysia).
52. See generally Greif, supra note 10; Bernstein, supra note 48; Richman, 
supra note 49. Each of the three articles examines Jewish traders.
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follows norms because it fits with his or her identity).53 While 
identity no doubt plays a role in human behavior, identity-based 
models may underemphasize the role that incentives, including fear 
of punishment by others, play in human behavior, particularly when 
stakes are high. They also underemphasize cognitive biases that 
allow individuals to subconsciously interpret their environment and 
actions in a self-serving way, thus allowing an actor to act in a self-
serving way while sincerely believing that he is acting in accordance 
with an altruistic identity.
In this Article, I suggest an alternative way to incorporate 
identity into models of group norms and norm enforcement without 
abandoning incentives. The ultimate motivator for compliance with 
norms is an actor’s incentives, particularly fear of punishment by 
others. But, in all but the most benign environments, highly 
adversarial norms cannot be sustainably enforced without the support 
of an incumbent institution that enforces a preexisting core norm—
one that facilitates a shared identity.
In conclusion to this Article, I would like to discuss a potential 
bypass to the path dependent formation of PLSs and at the same time 
introduce into the PLS literature a body of historical scholarship that 
has thus far not been considered: work on the “invention of 
tradition.”
The “invention of tradition,” a term coined by Eric Hobsbawm
& Terence Ranger,54 is a (surprisingly common) phenomenon of 
artificially creating a shared identity through “a set of practices . . . 
of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values 
and norms of behaviour by repetition . . . [and] attempt to establish
continuity with a suitable historical past.”55
53. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS:
HOW OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 57-58 (2010).
54. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION 
OF TRADITION 1, 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
55. Id. While many invented traditions are orchestrated by governments, 
they can be and are occasionally orchestrated by private parties. Private parties 
invent tradition in a variety of ways, including barter friendships, which oblige the 
parties to similar standards of loyalty to those they owe their kinsmen, see Richard
A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Primitive Law,
23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1980), and political adoption, in which two individuals 
(frequently, both adults) accept the status of parent and child, respectively, 
motivated by political reasons such as unifying or strengthening a dynasty, see
HUGH LINDSAY, ADOPTION IN THE ROMAN WORLD 169-73 (2009). Dynastically 
motivated adult adoption is practiced today in Japan. See Vikas Mehrotra et al., 
Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms, 108 J. FIN. ECON.
840 (2013); Adult Adoption in Japan: Keeping It in the Family, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 
56 Michigan State Law Review 2014:29
Invented tradition can be false, and some traditions have been 
alleged to be false. One example is the Scottish Highlander 
“traditional” garb, which Hugh Trevor-Roper claimed had developed 
after the union with England.56 Another example is the biblical 
stories of a unified Israelite-Judean kingdom ruled by the House of 
David from Jerusalem, which, Israel Finkelstein and Neil Silberman 
speculate, is a fiction created by Hezekiah, an eighth century BC 
Judean king, in an attempt to unify a mixed population of native 
Judeans and refugee Israelites in preparation for rebellion against the 
Assyrian Empire.57
Other invented traditions may be historically true, but are 
emphasized and ritualized in a context that channels historical 
identity into a contemporary target. An example, described by Yael 
Zerubavel, is the veneration of Yoseph Trumpeldor in Israel during 
the decades just prior and just following Israeli independence.58
Trumpeldor, a former officer in the Czarist army, was in 1920 among 
the residents of the Jewish village of Tel Hai, then on the border 
between French and British zones of control in territory captured 
from the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Tel Hai was 
attacked by an Arab militia and Trumpeldor died in the attack. 
Almost immediately Trumpeldor became a role model—a fighter 
and a farmer who died heroically in the defense of Tel Hai. He was 
portrayed as a continuation of a line of Jewish heroes going back to 
biblical times. With the possible exception of Trumpeldor’s dying 
words—“it is good to die for our country”59—the facts surrounding 
Trumpeldor’s life and death are seen as historically accurate.
Yet as Zerubavel points out, his elevation to a status of hero, 
the emphasis on his dedication to the greater good and on his 
military prowess, and the association between him and ancient 
Jewish military leaders all seem calculated to develop a shared image 
of the Jewish population in British Palestine as heroic, community-
minded, tied to the land, and able to defend itself. This image was 
2012, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21567419-family-firms-adopt-unusual-
approach-remain-competitive-keeping-it-family.
56. Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Invention of Tradition: The Highland 
Tradition of Scotland, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION, supra note 54, at 15.
57. ISRAEL FINKELSTEIN & NEIL ASHER SILBERMAN, DAVID AND SOLOMON:
IN SEARCH OF THE BIBLE’S SACRED KINGS AND THE ROOTS OF THE WESTERN 
TRADITION 121-49 (2006).
58. Yael Zerubavel, The Historic, the Legendary, and the Incredible: 
Invented Tradition and Collective Memory in Israel, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE 
POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 105, 105-23 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994).
59. Id. at 108.
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designed to suggest continuity with the image of the Jewish 
community of ancient times, while contrasting with an image of 
Jewish Diaspora communities as helpless, nomadic, and lacking 
military and agricultural proficiency. This image helped mobilize the 
community as it engaged in an increasingly bloody struggle leading 
to, and then following, the creation of the state of Israel.
If tradition can easily be invented, then path dependent 
formation of PLSs is not necessary. A collaborative core norm can 
be instantaneously invented when a more adversarial norm needs to 
be enforced, rather than relying on an incumbent PLS. For example, 
if Finkelstein & Silberman’s speculation on the unified kingdom is 
correct, then native Judeans and refugee Israelites may not have seen 
each other as kin before Hezekiah’s invented tradition of a unified 
kingdom, but upon accepting that tradition, Hezekiah could 
instantaneously enforce more adversarial norms, such as paying 
taxes to support a fortification effort or willingness to serve in the 
military in the defense of both ethnic groups.
However, the impact of invented traditions on PLS 
enforcement may not be so dramatic. Even an anecdotal observation 
of PLSs (as done, for example, in the introduction to this Article) 
demonstrates that the enforcement of highly adversarial norms does 
tend to rely on incumbent PLSs that enforced less adversarial core 
norms. If inventing tradition were easy and effective, one would 
expect an autonomous formation world in which numerous PLSs 
enforce highly adversarial norms without a history of enforcing core 
norms, but rather supported by instantaneously invented traditions.
Instead, invented traditions that are not supported by incumbent 
PLSs seem to appear in the public legal and political systems, where 
enforcement utilizes government’s monopoly on legitimate violence 
and thus does not need to rely on tradition to the same degree as 
PLSs. Invented tradition, if it matters at all in those contexts, 
increases government legitimacy on the margin, but public 
enforcement still relies on the police or military rather than on 
voluntary compliance due to a shared identity formed by a newly 
invented tradition.
Zerubavel may have identified a key limitation on the invention 
of tradition in her observation that belief in invented tradition tends 
to rely more on credibility (assessed according to the fit between the 
tradition and the individual’s existing identity) than on historical 
validity.60 She considers a controversy as to Trumpeldor’s dying 
60. Id. at 117.
58 Michigan State Law Review 2014:29
words, which the original tradition claimed were, in Hebrew, “it is 
good to die for our country,”61 but which a later tradition claimed 
were a crude Russian curse. The former interpretation fit a 
community in the midst of a military struggle, which needed military 
heroes and a willingness of individuals to sacrifice for the good of 
the community. The latter interpretation fit a community that gave 
more emphasis to individual needs and aspirations and was wary of 
heroes and demands for sacrifice. Zerubavel points out that, while 
historical evidence is, on balance, more supportive of the original 
tradition of Trumpeldor’s dying words, the later tradition had 
become more accepted. Historical truth was secondary to coherence 
with one’s values and identity.
Here, again, identity plays a role in norm enforcement. If 
invented tradition succeeds when it conforms to preexisting values 
and identity, then it is endogenous to the development of PLS
because an invented tradition will enhance an existing core norm of a 
shared identity, but will fail when it conflicts with the existing core 
norm. Incumbent PLSs that are enforcing core norms can be 
expected to enhance their enforcement power not only by adding 
expansion norms, but also by maintaining and buttressing the core 
norm through invented tradition. This interpretation explains why, 
despite the prevalence of invented tradition, successful PLSs 
enforcing highly adversarial norms rely on long-established core 
norms rather than on invented tradition.
Further inquiry into the role of invented tradition, and 
particularly the limits on effective invention of tradition, is beyond 
the scope of the present Article. Looking ahead, this line of 
scholarship has great promise in enriching the literature on private 
ordering and particularly in allowing scholars of PLSs to better 
incorporate the dynamic role of shared identity on norm 
enforcement.
61. Id. at 108.
